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Structured Abstract:
Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to investigate the work practices of network security
professionals and to propose a new and robust work practices model of these professionals.
Design/methodology/approach  -  The  proposed  work  practices  model  is  composed  by
combining the findings of ten notable empirical studies performed so far this century. The
proposed model was then validated by an online survey of 125 network security professionals
with a wide demographic spread.
Findings -  The empirical data collected from the survey of network security professionals
strongly validate the proposed work practices model. The results also highlight interesting
trends  for  different  groups  of  network  security  professionals,  with  respect  to  performing
different security-related activities.
Research limitations/implications - Further studies could investigate more closely the links
and dependencies between the different activities of the proposed work practices model and
tools used by network security professionals to perform these activities.
Practical implications -  A robust work practices model of network security professionals
could  hugely  assist  tool  developers  in  designing  usable  tools  for  network  security
management.
Originality/value -  This paper proposes a new work practices model of network security
professionals, which is built by consolidating existing empirical evidence and validated by
conducting  a  survey  of  network  security  professionals.  The  findings  enhance  the
understanding  of  tool  developers  about  the  day-to-day  activities  of  network  security
professionals, consequently assisting developers in designing better tools for network security
management.
1. Introduction
In an era of global reliance on networked systems, information security becomes a major
concern for most organisations (Goel and Shawky, 2009; Dlamini et al., 2009). Despite
the recent economic recession, the IT security market saw an increase of 12% in 2010 to 16.5
billion US dollars,  and is  expected to exceed 125 billion globally by 2015 (Posey  et al.,
2014). The individuals who are at the forefront of the battle of protecting the organisational
assets  against  unauthorised  use  and access  are  known as  network  security  professionals.
However,  little  is  known  about  the  work  practices  of  these  professionals.  A  deep
understanding about the work practices of network security professionals could vastly benefit
tool developers in designing effective and efficient tools for network security management
(Goodall et al., 2009; Shiravi et al., 2012). 
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A number of studies have been performed to examine the day-to-day activities of network
security professionals. However, considerable gaps and inconsistencies remain in terms of the
number of activities  as well  as  in  their  descriptions.  Further,  previous  studies  have been
limited  to  samples  sizes  of  as  few as  two participants,  which meant  that  they  could  not
present any statistically verifiable results. 
To address the limitations of existing empirical studies, we created a new work practices
model  to  describe  the  high-level  tasks  of  network  security  professionals,  developed  by
merging the findings of several existing empirical studies. To confirm the robustness of the
proposed model, it was validated with a survey of 125 network security professionals. Thus,
the  proposed  model  provides  a  broad  understanding  of  the  tasks  performed  by  network
security professionals by utilising the existing empirical evidence and complimenting it with
new empirical data. In addition, the results of the survey also highlight work practice trends
for  different  groups  of  network  security  professionals,  defined  by  the  job  titles  of  the
respondents, their daily exposure to network security, sector and size of their  organisations
and security management model (SMM) employed by their organisations. 
2. Defining a network security professional
Defining a network security professional on the basis of job titles is a natural first approach.
In such a scenario, one might consider only those with the keywords “network security” or
“security”  within  their  job  titles.  In  reality, the  network  security  industry  is  much  more
complex. D’Amico  et al. (2008) note that job titles vary considerably across organisations
and there is a lack of functional job descriptions of a network security professional. Previous
research  established that  the  management  of  network  security  varies  considerably  across
organisations. For this purpose, some organisations have dedicated security staff and formal
computer  security  incident  response  teams  (CSIRTs);  whereas,  in  other  organisations  no
formal  CSIRT  exists  and  the  existing  IT  staff  also  perform  security-related  activities
(Killcrece et al., 2003b; Hawkey et al., 2008). To address this lack of common descriptions
and  to  account  for  general  IT staff  (e.g.  network  managers  and  systems  administrators)
responsible for network security management, we avoid a reliance on job titles and define
network  security  professionals  as  “individuals  who  perform  network  security-related
activities as a part of their job”. A main contribution of this paper is to identify and define
these activities. 
In support of our argument, some existing empirical studies (e.g. Botta  et al., 2007 and
Goodall et al., 2009) also treated general IT staff as their targeted subjects when investigating
the work practices of network security professionals. In addition, the results from our online
survey confirm that individuals without the word “security” in their job titles also spend a
considerable amount of time performing security-related activities on a daily basis. 
3. Review of previous work practices studies
A number of empirical studies have been conducted to examine the work practices of network
security professionals. Some of these studies focused on specific types of network security
professionals  (e.g.  intrusion  detection  analysts  and incident  response  practitioners),  while
other studies took a broader perspective. This paper reviews ten notable empirical studies
performed  so  far  this  century, focusing  on  the  work  practices  of  “modern-day”  network
security professionals. 
Biros and Eppich (2001) performed a cognitive task analysis, asking intrusion detection
analysts to answer a set of questions from which they identified four major decision steps that
take place after an alert was received. The authors did not formally name nor describe the
activities, though from our analysis (see Section 4.1), the answers to these questions map to
three different activities: triage, incident verification and incident assessment. In addition, the
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number of participants involved in their study was not disclosed. Komlodi et al. (2004) also
investigated the work practices of intrusion detection analysts by conducting 9 contextual
interviews from which they summarise the intrusion detection process as three main phases:
monitoring, analysis and diagnosis, and response. From our analysis, these three phases map
to seven different activities (see Table I (b)). On the one hand, they extend the findings of
Biros and Eppich (2001) by identifying more activities. However, they neglected to identify
the activity  of  triage.  Thompson  et  al. (2006)  and  Goodall  et  al. (2004;  2009) similarly
investigated  the  work  practices  of  intrusion  detection  analysts.  Thompson  et  al. (2006)
performed a literature review and analysed empirical data from 2 interviews, describing it as
a cognitive task analysis from which they summarise the intrusion detection process as four
main  phases:  pre-processing  information,  monitoring  the  network,  analysing  attacks  and
responding to attacks. Similar to Komlodi et al. (2004), these four phases also map to seven
different  activities  in  our  model  (see  Table  I  (c)).  However,  the  activities  identified  by
Thompson et al. (2006) differ considerably from the activities identified by Biros and Eppich
(2001) and Komlodi et al. (2004). The findings from their study are based on empirical data
gathered from only 2 interviews, undermining their generalisability. Finally, Goodall  et al.
(2004;  2009)  use  individual  and  focus  group  interviews  to  study  the  work  practices  of
network intrusion detection analysts as well as a mailing list  analysis and a confirmatory
survey  that  generated  54  responses.  Their  findings  summarise  the  intrusion  detection
workflow  into  four  main  phases:  monitoring,  triage,  analysis  and  response.  From  our
analysis, these four phases map to nine different activities (see Table I (d)). The findings of
Goodall et al. (2009) are again inconsistent with the findings of all three reviewed empirical
studies, targeting the work practices of intrusion detection analysts.
Killcrece  et  al. (2003a)  examined  the  organisational  structures,  functions  and  services
provided by CSIRTs. A pilot survey of CSIRTs, in which they were asked to indicate the
services that they currently provide, generated 29 responses and identified twenty different
services.  However,  the  services/activities  are  only  named,  without  any  descriptions. In
addition,  there  are  considerable  overlaps  between  the  identified  activities.  For  example,
‘monitoring IDS’ and ‘monitoring network and system logs’ are identified as two separate
activities,  which  could  have  been  easily  abstracted  into  a  single  high-level  activity  of
monitoring. Table I (e) provides a consolidated view of the activities identified by Killcrece
et al. (2003a). Werlinger  et al. (2010) also conducted a study to understand the diagnostic
work during security incident response, interviewing 16 security practitioners belonging to
seven different organisations. Their findings summarise the diagnostic work of IT security
incident  response  into  three  main  phases:  preparation,  anomaly  detection  and  anomaly
analysis. From our analysis, these three phases map to eight different activities (see Table I
(f)). In contrast to Killcrece et al. (2003a), descriptions are provided for all of the identified
activities. However, the activities only represent a subset of those identified by Killcrece et
al. (2003a).
In contrast to the above empirical studies that focused on two particular types of network
security  professionals,  the  following  four  studies  targeted  more  generic  network  security
professionals. Stolze  et al. (2003a, 2003b) conducted field observations to investigate the
tasks of operators working in a security operations centre (SOC). They present a descriptive
model of the tasks performed by SOC operators when processing the incoming stream of new
security events. According to their model, this process occurs over five stages: new event
triage,  strange  event  analysis,  pattern  assessment,  alert  management  and  false  positive
management.  From our analysis,  these five phases map to four different activities in  our
model  (see  Table  I  (g)).  Similar  to  Biros  and  Eppich  (2001),  insufficient  information  is
provided about the field observations (e.g. number of participants and total observation time),
making  it  difficult  to  draw reliable  and  generalisable  conclusions.  Kandogan  and  Haber
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(2005) also employed field observations  to study different aspects of the working life  of
network  security  professionals,  including  their  day-to-day  activities.  They  profiled  two
typical  security  administrators  and  described  five  real-life  security-related  case  studies
involving the administrators. They do not explicitly name the activities, though from our
analysis, their findings map to eleven different security-related activities (see Table I (h)).
However, a relatively small sample size of only two subjects limits the generalisability of
their findings. Botta et al. (2007) relied on interviews to understand the workplace and tools
of network security professionals. They conducted fourteen semi-structured interviews and
identified fifteen different tasks/activities performed by network security professionals. The
authors only name these activities and do not provide any descriptions, though they provide
examples  of  how different  tools  are  used to  perform these  activities.  However, there are
considerable overlaps between the activities. For example, they present ‘verify configuration
of email services’ and ‘patch or upgrade systems’ as two separate activities, which could have
been abstracted into a single high-level activity of configuration and maintenance. Werlinger
et  al. (2009)  further  extends  their  findings  by  analysing  sixteen  more  semi-structured
interviews and identifying (and describing) two additional activities, named ‘develop security
policies’ and ‘train and educate’. Table I (i) provides a consolidated view of the activities
identified by these two studies. Finally, D'Amico  et al. (2005; 2008) studied 41 computer
network defence analysts, using semi-structured interviews, observations, a review of critical
incidents, and a hypothetical scenario construction. They identified six main analysis roles
that accounted for all of the cognitive work observed: triage analysis, escalation analysis,
correlation analysis, threat analysis, incident response analysis and forensic analysis. From
our analysis, these six roles map to eight different activities of network security professionals
(see Table I (h)). This set of activities is again inconsistent with the findings of all of the other
reviewed studies performed in this area.
Despite the undeniable contribution of the existing empirical studies, considerable gaps and
inconsistencies  remain  in  the  description  of  the  work  practices  of  network  security
professionals. For example, some studies only relied on the names of the day-to-day activities
and did not provide any descriptions, which can be problematic due to a lack of uniform,
accepted descriptions. The inconsistencies appear in both the number of activities identified
as well as in their descriptions. This necessitates the need to develop a new and consistent
work practices model to describe the high-level tasks of network security professionals. 
4. Proposed work practices model
4.1 Methodology
The reviewed empirical studies employed a diverse range of research methodologies, ranging
from relatively informal approaches (e.g. authors' collective experience and survey follow-up
discussions),  to  more  formal,  scientific  methods  (e.g.  interviews,  field  observations  and
surveys). Thus, a good foundation of research has taken place regarding the work practices of
small  groups  of  users.  We utilise  this  empirical  evidence  and create  our  proposed  work
practices  model  by  merging,  splitting,  naming,  renaming and rearranging  the  names  and
descriptions of the activities identified by the reviewed empirical studies. It is important to
note that, to compose the proposed model, we only consider empirical studies and do not
consider other literature that base their findings or recommendations on non-empirical data,
e.g. CERT handbook (West-Brown et al., 2003) and NIST guidelines (Cichonski et al., 2012).
Also, the scope of the proposed work practices model is to identify only the security-related
activities of network security professionals; it  does not consider generic activities such as
Internet searching, project management and network design.
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Merging: Where a reviewed study identified similar activities with slightly different names
or descriptions, the activities were merged together and renamed appropriately. This was done
both within a particular empirical study, and also to activities from multiple reviewed studies.
For example, Killcrece  et al. (2003a) identified two activities,  artefact analysis and  virus
handling, which were merged and renamed as ‘artefact handling’. In this case, the authors did
not  provide activity  descriptions  so that  our decision was based upon the activity  names
alone. On the other hand, Komlodi  et al. (2004) do not specifically name the activity, but
categorise the inspection of artefact as one of the activities of the analysis phase. Similarly,
Kandogan  and  Haber  (2005)  do  not  name  the  activity,  though  they  observe  a  security
administrator collecting information about MyDoom virus to understand its mechanics. The
description of this activity was composed by combining the descriptions of Komlodi  et al.
(2004) and Kandogan and Haber (2005). 
Splitting: Where a study identified activities that were broad in nature and we had empirical
evidence from other studies suggesting that these activities are decomposable as multiple
security-related activities in practice, the activity was divided into an appropriate number of
small activities, and renamed accordingly. For example, Killcrece et al. (2003a) identified an
activity, incident handling, where empirical evidence from other studies (e.g. Komlodi et al.,
2004; Werlinger  et al., 2010) suggested that there are multiple security-related activities as
part  of  incident  handling.  Therefore,  this  activity  was  divided  into  a  number  of  smaller
activities,  corresponding  to  three  high-level  activities  in  our  model:  incident  detection,
incident analysis and incident response. 
Some  of  the  reviewed  studies  described  the  work  practices  of  network  security
professionals as phases, instead of activities. In most cases, these phases incorporated several
security-related  activities  that  were  not  explicitly  named  within  the  descriptions.  For
example, Goodall  et al. (2009) describe ‘response’ as one of the four phases of the work
practices  of  intrusion  detection  analysts,  though further  analysis  identified  four  security-
related  activities.  Their  descriptions  were  compared  with  the  findings  of  other  reviewed
empirical  studies  and  were  named  as  incident  containment,  forensic  analyses,  internal
feedback and external feedback within the proposed work practices model.
Naming: In some cases, the studies described potential security-related activities but did
not explicitly name them. Biros and Eppich (2001) and Kandogan and Haber (2005) did not
name any of the activities of network security professionals. Instead, Biros and Eppich (2001)
present them as four major decision steps that take place after an alert is received, which
involve answering four different questions, such as ‘what was the depth of the compromise?’.
Kandogan  and  Haber  (2005)  describe  the  activities  as  the  profiles  of  two  security
administrators and present five real-life case studies encountered by them. In such a scenario,
the descriptions of the potential security-related activities were compared with the findings of
other  reviewed  empirical  studies  to  ascertain  their  validity.  In  a  case  where  sufficient
empirical evidence was found in favour of a description, the activity was appropriately named
and described. For example Biros and Eppich (2001) describe answering the above question
as one of the major decision steps taken by an intrusion detection analyst. This process was
compared with the findings of other reviewed empirical studies and it was found to coincide
with incident assessment. 
Renaming: Activity renaming was usually instigated together with merging, splitting and
rearranging. Though in some cases, when the majority of the reviewed studies identified an
activity  with similar  names and one or  a few studies  identified the same activity  with a
different name, then the latter was renamed. Renaming also occurred when the description of
an activity strongly suggested that the current name is inappropriate. For example, Stolze et
al. (2003b) identified the internal feedback activity of the proposed model with the name of
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false positive management. However, when the description of the activity was composed by
combining the findings of multiple reviewed studies, this name did not fit well with the scope
of the activity. 
Rearranging:  In some cases, the reviewed studies identified standalone activities, but we
either had considerable evidence from other studies, or it was apparent from the descriptions
of the activities, that they would be better suited as sub-activities. In such a scenario, the
activity  under  consideration  was  rearranged as  a  sub-activity  of  a  suitable  main  activity.
Rearranging was also performed when the reviewed studies identified an activity as a sub-
activity, but  we either  had  substantial  evidence  from other  reviewed studies,  or  a  strong
indication from its description suggesting the opposite. In such a scenario, the activity under
consideration was rearranged from a sub-activity to a main activity. For example, D'Amico
and  Whitley  (2008)  identify  incident  assessment as  a  standalone  activity.  However,  the
description of the activity as well as three separate studies (Komlodi et al. (2004); Goodall et
al. (2009); Werlinger  et al. (2010)) suggest that  incident assessment is a sub-activity of a
main, high-level activity of incident analysis, which is incorporated into our model.
4.2 Work practices model of network security professionals 
Following  the  aforementioned  methodology,  ten  main  security-related  activities  were
identified,  which  constitute  our  proposed  work  practices  model  of  network  security
professionals.  In  addition,  there  are  also  eleven  sub-activities  that  fall  under  the  main
activities of  incident detection,  incident  analysis,  incident response and  feedback.  Table I
(row  1)  presents  the  work  practices  model,  providing  a  side-by-side  comparison  of  the
activities identified by the reviewed empirical studies.
[Insert Table I here]
It is important to note that while we are not concerned about the order of the activities, we
present the proposed work practices model according to what seems to be a natural order for
performing some specific  network  security  tasks.  For  example,  it  would seem natural  to
detect an incident  before its  analysis.  However, the reader  should not take this  model as
strictly linear. Below, the activities of the proposed work practices model are listed, with their
full descriptions. The descriptions are the same as those used as part of our survey validation
(see Section 5), except that configuration and maintenance and network security assessment
were  slightly  modified  as  a  result  of  feedback  from  our  survey  of  network  security
professionals (we explain this further in Section 5.2.3).
1. Configuration  and  maintenance: Configuration  and  maintenance  of  security
infrastructure, tools or services (e.g. demilitarized zones, VLANs, IDS, anti-viruses,
remote access and authentication mechanisms). 
2. Threat analysis: Analysis of external data sources (e.g. security mailing lists, hackers’
websites and news articles) to learn about new bugs, vulnerabilities or attacks; or to
predict the identity, motives or sponsorship of an attacker.
3. Network  security  assessment: Assessing  the  security  of  an  organisation’s network
based on the requirements defined by the organisation or by other applicable industry
standards (e.g. ISO 27001 [1] and ICO guidelines [2]). 
4. Incident detection: Detection of suspicious events within the monitored network. This
can be divided into the following four sub-activities:
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i. Monitoring: Surveillance of an internal network through automated systems
(e.g. IDSs, firewalls, Cacti and SmokePing) to discover potentially malicious
activities.
ii. Received  notifications: Receiving  notifications  from  different  stakeholders
(e.g. end-users, colleagues and external organisations) to discover potentially
malicious activities.
iii. Data  correlation: Correlation  of  current  and  historical  data  from a  single
source (e.g. packet captures, network flows and IDS alerts), or correlation of
data from multiple sources, to find new and unexplained patterns for further
analysis.
iv. Triage: Quickly dismissing a suspicious event as a false positive or prioritising
it for further analysis.
5. Incident  analysis: In-depth  analysis  of  the  suspicious  incidents  that  have  been
detected. It encompasses the following three sub-activities:
i. Incident verification: Analysis  of data collected from multiple sources (e.g.
packet  captures,  network  flows  and  system  logs)  to  establish  that  a
compromise has actually occurred. 
ii. Artefact  handling: Collecting  copies  of  artefacts  (e.g.  computer  viruses,
exploits and toolkits) from compromised systems, analysing their mechanics
and effects and developing response strategies.
iii. Incident  assessment: Examining  the  nature  and  scope  of  the  incident,  the
extent of damage caused and available response strategies.
6. Incident response: Taking action in response to a successful intrusion. This can be
divided into the following two sub-activities:
i. Incident  containment: Taking  or  assigning  the  appropriate  measures  (e.g.
cleaning the infected system, disconnecting the infected node and rebuilding a
system) in response to a successful intrusion.
ii. Forensic analysis: Collection, preservation and analysis of evidence from a
compromised system in support of a law enforcement investigation. 
7. Feedback: Providing  feedback  to  an  internal  environment  and  to  the  external
community. This can be divided into the following two sub-activities.
i. Internal  feedback: Providing  feedback  to  the  internal  environment  (e.g.
removing or tuning an IDS signature, adding a firewall rule and notifying a
colleague).
ii. External  feedback: Providing  feedback  to  the  external  community  (e.g.
informing  the  community  or  the  vendor  of  the  product  about  new
vulnerabilities or attacks and producing technical documents).
8. Security  policy  development: Developing  or  auditing  an  organisation’s  security
policies based on the requirements defined by the organisation or by other applicable
industry standards.
9. Development of security tools: Development of new security tools, scripts, patches or
plug-ins.
10. Training and awareness: Training and educating different constituents (e.g. end-users
and new employees) about security issues and organisational security policies.
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5. Validation of the proposed work practices model
5.1 Methodology
In order to assess the robustness of the proposed model, it was validated by conducting an
online survey of network security  professionals.  By using a survey we can reach a wide
geographical spread of professionals and a large number of responses can be collected in a
short  time, at  a low cost.  For this reason, a survey was an appropriate method to fit  our
purpose,  which  is  to  validate  our  consolidation  of  existing  empirical  evidence  (primarily
gathered using other research methods, e.g. interviews and field observations) in a new work
practices model. Of six survey questions, five were related to participant information: job
titles (question 1), daily time spent on security-related activities (question 2), sectors of their
organisations  (question  3),  organisation  size  (question  4)  and  organisation  security
management  model  (SMM)  (question  5).  Question  6  was  the  primary  question  used  to
validate  the  activities  of  the  proposed  work  practices  model.  For  each  activity,  the
respondents  were  asked  whether  the  activity  was  ‘performed  by  me’,  ‘performed  by  a
colleague’ and/or  ‘never  performed’.  Respondents  were  then  asked  to  specify  any  other
security-related activities, other than the ones presented to them in our model. 
5.2 Findings
The online survey generated 125 responses for the six questions. The spread of responses
gathered from questions 1-5, is presented in Table II.
[Insert Table II here]
5.2.1 Job titles and daily exposure to network security
The survey received  responses  from individuals  with  25  different  job  titles,  which  were
grouped logically in Table III. 14 out of 25 job titles included the word "security" or a similar
keyword (e.g. penetration tester, information assurance analyst and technical privacy leader),
and  were  categorised  as  "security  professionals".  Similarly,  3  job  titles  were  related  to
networking (e.g.  network  administrator  and network  engineer),  and  grouped as  "network
professionals".  2  job  titles  were  related  to  systems  (systems  administrator  and  systems
engineer),  and  categorised  as  "systems  professionals".  The  remaining  6  job  titles  (e.g.
technology  strategist,  consultant  and  DevOps)  did  not  fit  in  any  of  the  afore-mentioned
categories, and were classified as "other".
Table III presents the relationship between these demographic groups and the amount of
time  they  spend  on  performing  security-related  activities  on  a  daily  basis.  These  results
highlight a reasonably close match between security title and the performance of security-
related activities. For example, more than 75% of the security professionals spend more than
half  of  their  time on security-related  activities,  with only  13% and 15% respectively for
network professionals and systems professionals. 
[Insert Table III here]
5.2.2 Validation of the proposed work practices model
The results  of  the  online survey strongly validate  the  proposed work practices  model  of
network security professionals. Figure 1 presents the validation results for each activity of the
model. In particular, note that all but one activity is “never performed” by less than 20% of
respondents. 
[Insert Figure 1 here]
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5.2.3 Newly identified activities by survey respondents 
In addition to validating the activities of the proposed model, 19 respondents identified 41
potentially new security-related activities, though we determined that 12 activities were too
generic for our model (not specific to network security), e.g.  business continuity planning,
project coordination and  network design. From the remaining 29 security-related activities,
24 were fully covered by existing activities of our model. For example,  threat intelligence
gathering, network and mobile forensic and remote access services are fully covered by the
activities  of  threat  analysis,  forensic  analysis and  configuration  and  maintenance
respectively. The remaining 5 security-related activities specified by the respondents were
partially  covered  by  2  activities  (configuration  and  maintenance and  network  security
assessment) of the proposed work practices model.  Therefore,  the descriptions of these 2
activities  were  slightly  modified  in  order  to  fully  embrace  5  security-related  activities
identified by 5 different survey respondents, as described below.
Firstly, two respondents each described one additional security-related activity:  “design,
implementation and deployment of distributed federated identity systems” and “configuration
and maintenance of policies which are not seen as security-specific but which have security
as  part  of  their  role,  e.g.  routing  policies”.  Both  of  these  activities  are  related  to  the
configuration  and  maintenance  of  network  security  infrastructure.  Our  proposed  work
practices  model  had  an  activity,  configuration  and  maintenance,  to  deal  with  the
configuration  and  maintenance  of  security  tools  and  services,  but  not  the  security
infrastructure. Therefore, the description of  configuration and maintenance activity of the
proposed model was correspondingly updated (see Section 4.2).
Secondly, three survey respondents each described one additional security-related activity:
“liaise with legal/regulatory functions (e.g. ICO and FCA)”, “ISO 27001 information security
audit”  and  “IT  compliance”.  These  three  activities  are  related  to  network  security
audit/assessment based on the requirements defined by external regulatory authorities. The
proposed work practices model had an activity, named network security assessment, to deal
with network security audits based on the requirement defined by the organisation itself, but
not  the  external  regulatory  authorities.  Therefore,  the  description  of  network  security
assessment activity of the proposed model was correspondingly updated (see Section 4.2).
5.3 Work practice trends for different groups
The relatively large sample size of the online survey enables us to present the work practice
trends for different groups of network security professionals. These trends could be of great
interest  to  an  individual  who  is  investigating  a  particular  section  of  the  population  or
interested in comparing the behaviour of multiple groups.  The groups (see Table II) were
created on the basis  of  the job titles of the respondents,  their  daily  exposure to  network
security, sector of their organisations, size of their organisations and SMM employed by their
organisations. 
In order to examine the impact of job title and daily exposure to network security on the
work practices, the number of respondents answering “performed by me” [3] for each activity
of the work practices model was calculated for each group. When examining the impact of
size, sector and SMM employed by an organisation, the number of respondents answering
“performed by me” and/or “performed by a colleague” [4] was calculated. Subsequently, a
two-tailed  Fisher’s  exact  test  was  performed  to  determine  any  statistically  significant
differences between the groups. To correct for multiple comparisons, pairwise comparisons
were performed using Fisher’s exact test with Bonferroni adjusted alpha on the groups being
identified  as  having  statistically  significant  differences.  The  potential  criticism  against
Bonferroni adjustments is that it is relatively conservative since it reduces the probability of a
type I error [5], but at the expense of a type II error [6]. Therefore, the decision of whether or
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not to use the Bonferroni corrections depends on the circumstance of each study (Perneger,
1998).  In  this  study  (1)  a  large  number  of  tests  were  carried  out  without  pre-planned
hypotheses and (2) it was imperative to avoid a type I error, i.e. detecting an effect that is not
present. Both of these scenarios made it appropriate to use the Bonferroni corrections for
pairwise comparisons within this study (Perneger, 1998; Armstrong, 2014).
In  each  of  the  subsections  below, a  number  of  statistically  significant  differences  are
identified  between  groups  and  their  performance  of  certain  activities.  For  example,  the
number of “systems professionals” who perform the configuration and maintenance activity
is statistically significantly greater than the number of “security professionals”. Such relative
comparisons  are  key  to  understanding  the  relationship  between  different  professional
groupings, and should be used to help guide further studies, as well as more appropriate tool
design. Table IV summarises the results of work practice trends for different groups.
[Insert Table IV here]
5.3.1 Impact of job title on performing day-to-day activities
The job titles of the survey respondents led to the creation of four groups (see Table IV).
Fisher’s exact  test  yields  a  statistically  significant  difference  between  these  four  groups
(α=0.05)  for  the  activities  of  configuration  and  maintenance (p<0.001),  monitoring
(p=0.007), received notifications (p=0.019), incident containment (p=0.033) and training and
awareness (p=0.004), with no statistically significant difference for the remaining activities.
Further  pairwise comparisons  with Bonferroni  adjusted alpha (0.05/6 = 0.008)  yields  the
following results:
 Configuration  and  maintenance: A statistically  significantly  larger  proportion  of
“network professionals”  (p=0.006)  and “systems professionals”  (p<0.001)  perform
this activity, compared to “security professionals”. 
 Monitoring: A statistically significantly larger proportion of “network professionals”
perform this activity, compared to “security professionals” (p=0.003). 
 Received  notifications: A statistically  significantly  larger  proportion  of  “network
professionals” perform this activity, compared to “security professionals” (p=0.008). 
 Incident containment: No statistically significant difference was found within any of
the 6 pairwise comparisons.
 Training and awareness: A statistically  significantly larger  proportion of “security
professionals” perform this activity, compared to “network professionals” (p=0.006). 
The remaining pairwise comparisons for the aforementioned activities did not show any
statistically significant difference. 
5.3.2 Impact of daily exposure to network security on performing day-to-day activities
Four groups were created on the basis of daily time spent on performing security-related
activities by the survey respondents (see Table IV).  Fisher’s exact test yields a statistically
significant difference between these four groups (α=0.05) for the activity of artefact handling
(p=0.023), with no statistically significant difference for the remaining activities. Pairwise
comparisons  with  Bonferroni  adjusted  alpha  (0.05/6  =  0.008)  showed  a  statistically
significantly larger proportion of network security professionals who spend “25% to 50%” of
their daily time on security-related activities, performing the activity of  artefact handling,
compared to professionals who spend “less than 25%” of their daily time (p=0.008). The
remaining 5 pairwise comparisons for this activity did not show any statistically significant
difference.
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5.3.3 Impact of organisation’s sector on performing day-to-day activities
The survey received responses from 16 different organisational sectors. A logical grouping
was performed to combine similar organisational sectors into the same category. In cases
where  an  organisational  sector  did  not  provide  a  sufficient  number  of  responses  for
statistically viable results, they were combined to form more general, larger groupings (e.g.
“other”). Though, this did result in losing a logical theme for the group. This process led to
the creation of three groups (see Table IV). 
Fisher’s exact test yields a statistically significant difference between these three groups
(α=0.05) for the activity of training and awareness (p=0.037), with no statistically significant
difference  for  the  remaining  activities.  For  training  and  awareness,  none  of  3  pairwise
comparisons  with  Bonferroni  adjusted  alpha  (0.05/3  =  0.017)  yield  any  statistically
significant difference.
5.3.4 Impact of organisation’s size on performing day-to-day activities
Four groups were created on the basis of the organisation’s size of the survey respondents
(see Table IV).  Fisher’s exact test yields a statistically significant difference between these
four  groups  (α=0.05)  for  the  activities  of  incident  assessment (p=0.016)  and  external
feedback (p=0.002), with no statistically significant difference for the remaining activities.
Further  pairwise comparisons  with Bonferroni  adjusted alpha (0.05/6 = 0.008)  yields  the
following results:
 Incident assessment: No statistically significant difference was found within any of
the 6 pairwise comparisons.
 External feedback: A statistically significantly larger proportion of network security
professionals working within organisations having “50 to 249” employees perform
this activity, compared to organisations employing “less than 50” people (p=0.002) or
organisations employing “250 to 1000” people (p<0.001).  The remaining 4 pairwise
comparisons did not show any statistically significant difference.
5.3.5 Impact of different SMMs on performing day-to-day activities
The data about the SMMs employed by the organisations of the survey respondents also led
to the creation of four groups (see Table IV). The SSMs and their descriptions were adopted
from Killcrece et al. (2003b) and Hawkey et al. (2008). 
Fisher’s exact test  yields a statistically significant difference between these four groups
(α=0.05)  for  the  activities  of  network  security  assessment (p<0.001),  data  correlation
(p=0.001),  triage (p=0.041)  and  incident  assessment (p=0.023),  with  no  statistically
significant  difference  for  the  remaining  activities.  Further  pairwise  comparisons  with
Bonferroni adjusted alpha (0.05/6 = 0.008) yields the following results:
 Network security assessment: A statistically significantly larger proportion of network
security professionals working within organisations that employ a centralised SSM
model (p=0.005) or hybrid SMM model (p<0.001) perform this activity, compared to
professionals who work within organisations that do not employ any SMM model.
The  remaining  4  pairwise  comparisons  did  not  show  any  statistically  significant
difference. 
 Data correlation: A statistically significantly larger proportion of network security
professionals  working  within  organisations  that  employ  a  hybrid  SMM  model
(p=0.004)  perform  this  activity,  compared  to  professionals  who  work  within
organisations  that  do  not  employ  any  SMM  model.  The  remaining  5  pairwise
comparisons did not show any statistically significant difference. 
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 Triage and  Incident  assessment: No  statistically  significant  difference  was  found
within any of the 12 pairwise comparisons for these two activities.
6. Discussion and implications
The  results  of  our  study  provide  two  key  contributions  toward  a  more  complete
understanding of network security professionals. Firstly, we propose a robust work practices
model of network security professionals, which is created by utilising the existing empirical
evidence and validated by gathering new empirical evidence through an online survey of 125
network  security  professionals.  This  model  provides  a  relatively  deep  and  broad
understanding about the day-to-day activities performed by network security professionals,
which could vastly benefit tool developers in designing and developing effective and efficient
tools  for  network  security  management.  The  activities  and  their  descriptions  within  the
proposed model provide an outline of the functionalities for a usable tool, targeting one or a
few specific activities. For example, if a tool developer intends to build a tool to support the
activity of  incident analysis, the proposed model would inform him/her that the process of
incident analysis involves  incident verification, artefact handling and  incident assessment.
Therefore, a usable tool targeted for incident analysis needs to provide sufficient functionality
to perform the aforementioned sub-activities. This may include the support for analysing data
collected from a diverse set of sources (e.g. packet captures, network flows and system logs),
collection  and  analysis  of  artefacts  (e.g.  computer  viruses,  exploits  and  toolkits),  and
examination  of  the  nature  and  scope  of  the  incident,  the  extent  of  damage  caused  and
available response strategies. In the absence of our proposed model, security management
tool  developers  would not  be able  to  acquire  this  level  of  details  regarding the  required
functionalities  of  a  particular  tool,  due  to  the  numerous gaps  and inconsistencies  in  the
existing work practices models of network security professionals (see Table I).
Secondly, we identify some interesting work practice trends for different groups of network
security professionals, which are summarised in Table IV. For example, a common perception
about “network professionals” is that they are mainly concerned with the configuration and
maintenance  of  network-related  devices  (e.g.  switches,  routers  and  network
health/performance monitoring tools),  and not with the  configuration and maintenance of
security-related devices (e.g. firewalls, IDSs/IPSs and anti-viruses) or the process of incident
detection (i.e.  monitoring and  received notifications). However, this study highlights that a
statistically significantly larger proportion of “network professionals” perform the security-
related activities of configuration and maintenance, monitoring and received notifications, as
compared to “security professionals”. This is an interesting finding for which there could be
several possible explanations. For example, in many organisations no dedicated security staff
exists and the existing IT staff also perform security-related activities (Killcrece et al., 2003b;
Hawkey  et al., 2008). This was also confirmed in our online survey of network security
professionals,  in  which  around  31 percent  respondents  replied  to  be  working  within  the
organisations that do not have dedicated security staff. Also, configuration and maintenance,
monitoring and received notifications are just three of seventeen security-related activities of
network  security  professionals.  Considering  the  scope  and  criticality  of  the  remaining
fourteen  security-related  activities,  we  think  that  even  in  organisations  with  dedicated
security staff, it is highly likely that relatively less complex activities (e.g. configuration and
maintenance and  monitoring)  are  assigned to  generic  IT staff  (e.g.  network  and systems
professionals) while the dedicated security professionals are delegated to relatively complex
and critical tasks (e.g. network security assessment, incident analysis and incident response).
Both of the above reasons could potentially have led to the performance of the activities of
configuration  and  maintenance,  monitoring and  received  notifications  by  statistically
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significantly  larger  proportion  of  “network  professionals”,  as  compared  to  “security
professionals”. 
7. Limitations and future work
While our approach allowed us to investigate in detail the work practices of network security
professionals, this approach was not without limitations. An online questionnaire enabled us
to  gather  a  relatively  large  number  of  responses  from  a  wide  geographical  spread  of
professionals, which was imperative to build a robust work practices model. However, this
restricted us from gathering rich qualitative data, which could have been used to explore in
detail different interesting trends highlighted in Section 6 of the paper. Also, while we have a
reasonable spread of survey responses (see Table II) in terms of respondents’ daily time spent
on security-related activities, a slightly higher participation of professionals who spend more
than  50%  of  their  time  on  security-related  activities  could  have  created  a  better  mix,
potentially enhancing the robustness of the proposed work practices model. 
A relatively broad understanding of the work practices of network security professionals
also highlights  some apparent  dependencies  between the day-to-day activities of  network
security professionals. For example, incident detection initiates incident analysis, which then
triggers the incident response. However, further empirical research is needed to explore these
links and dependencies in greater detail. Further studies might also investigate the tools used
by network security professionals to perform different security-related activities, in an effort
to identify particular features that need to be added or require improvements, e.g. flexible
reporting,  support  for  collaboration  and  information  sharing,  and  support  for  task
prioritisation.
8. Conclusion
This  work  reviews  several  existing  empirical  studies  and  highlights  numerous gaps  and
inconsistencies in the description of the work practices of network security professionals. It
also merges existing empirical evidence to create a new and more consistent work practices
model of network security professionals. The robustness of the proposed model is confirmed
by  conducting  an  online  survey  of  125  network  security  professionals  with  a  wide
demographic spread. The model itself should be a useful aid to tool developers, thus better
meeting the needs of network security professionals. The findings of the survey also highlight
interesting  trends  for  different  groups  of  network  security  professionals,  with  respect  to
performing different activities, which should help to better meet the needs of these groups. 
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3. Job  title  and  daily  exposure  to  network  security  are  traits  that  are  linked  with
individuals,  and  not  with  organisations.  Therefore,  only  a  “performed  by  me”
response can equate to an activity being performed by an individual. In this case, there
remains  no  difference  between  the  responses  of  “performed  by  a  colleague”  and
“never performed”.
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4. Organisational sector, organisational size and SMM employed by an organisation are
traits that are linked with organisations, and not with individuals. Therefore, both the
“performed by me” and “performed by a colleague” responses equate to an activity
being performed within an organisation. 
5. In statistical hypothesis testing, a type I error is an incorrect rejection of a true null
hypothesis. More simply, a type I error is detecting an effect that is not present.
6. In  statistical  hypothesis  testing,  a  type  II  error  is  a  failure  to  reject  a  false  null
hypothesis. More simply, a type II error is failing to detect an effect that is present.
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Table I:
Proposed work practices 






































































































































































Activities identified by reviewed empirical studies      [● = fully described;   ○ = named only (without a description);   empty cell = not menti ned]
a) Biros and Eppich (2001) ○ ○ ○
b) Komlodi et al. (2004) ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
c) Thompson et al. (2006) ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
d) Goodall et al. (2004; 2009) ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
e) Killcrece et al. (2003a) * ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
f) Werlinger et al. (2010) ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
g) Stolze et al. (2003a, 2003b) ● ● ● ●
h) Kandogan and Haber (2005) ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
i)
Botta et al. (2007) ** 
and Werlinger et al. 
(2009) 
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
j) D'Amico et al. (2005; 2008) ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
* Killcrece et al. (2003) do not explicitly name the activities of ‘data correlation’, ‘triage’, ‘incident verification’, ‘incident assessment’ and ‘incident containment’. However, they
identify the activity of ‘incident handling’, which is a relatively broad term and encompasses the aforementioned activities.  
** Botta et al. (2007) do not provide formal descriptions of the activities, though they do present examples of how different tools are used to perform these activities. Therefore,
the activities identified by them are considered as “fully described” within the table.
Table I: Proposed work practices model and mapping of activities identified by reviewed empirical studies
Table II:
Table II: Spread of responses from answers to questions 1-5 as collected from the online
survey
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Job title
Security professionals 46.4 %
Network professionals 24.0 %
Systems professionals 20.8 %
Other (e.g. technology strategist and consultant) 8.8 %
Daily time spent on security-related activities
Less than 25% 28.8 %
25% to 50% 26.4 %
51% to 75% 17.6 %
More than 75% 27.2 %
Organisation sector
Information technology 46.4 %
Educational 24.0 %
Other (e.g. energy, healthcare and military) 29.6 %
Organisation size (No. of employees)
Less than 50 18.4 %
50 to 249 21.6 %
250 to 1000 17.6 %
Over 1000 42.4 %
Organisation security management model (SMM)
None 31.2 %
Decentralised model 9.6 %
Centralised model 34.4 %
Hybrid model 24.8 %
Table III:









Count % Count % Count % Count %
Less than 25% 4 6.90 15 50.00 14 53.85 3 27.27
25% to 50% 10 17.24 11 36.67 8 30.77 4 36.36
51% to 75% 12 20.69 3 10.00 4 15.38 3 27.27
More than 75% 32 55.17 1 3.33 0 0.00 1 9.09
Table III: Correlation between job titles and their daily exposure to network security 
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Figure 1:
Figure 1: Validation results of the proposed work practices model
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* Indicates the groups with a larger proportion of members performing a particular activity. 
Table IV: Summary of results of work practice trends for different groups
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